“THE COURTS ARE NOT CONCERNED AT ALL WITH THE MERITS OF LEAVING OR REMAINING IN THE EU”: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISION TO TRIGGER ARTICLE 50 REJECTED

In a judgment handed down on Monday the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal for permission to judicially review the prime minister’s decision to notify the European Union of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU, as well as the notification itself.

BACKGROUND

On 13 August 2018, four applicants issued a claim for judicial review. The applicants sought orders quashing the prime minister’s decision to serve the article 50 notification, and the notification itself.

Susan Wilson, the lead applicant, is the chair of Bremain in Spain, a pressure group campaigning for the rights of British expats and a second referendum on Brexit.

On 21 September 2018, Supperstone J refused permission to proceed. The applicants sought reconsideration of that decision at an oral hearing, which Ouseley J heard on 7 December, delivering his judgment on 10 December 2018 and refusing the application. In Wilson and others v R (on the application of ) v the Prime Minister [2019] EWCA Civ 304 the applicants appealed against Ouseley J’s decision.

APPLICATION

The applicants claimed that the prime minister’s decision to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to leave the trading bloc was unlawful. This claim was premised on the contention that the decision and subsequent notification were based on the result of a referendum that was itself unlawful as a result of corrupt and illegal practices, notably offences of overspending committed by those involved in the campaign to leave the EU.

JUDGMENT

While acknowledging that some bodies and individuals involved in the referendum campaign breached campaign financing requirements, the Court found that these breaches did not mean that the referendum result was “procured by fraud”.

Giving judgment for the Court, Hickinbottom LJ held that:

[T]here is simply no evidential basis for the proposition that the breaches, or any of them, are material in the sense that, had they not occurred, the result of the referendum would have been different.

Aware of the precarious position the Court occupied, he went on to say that:

[F]or the court to declare void the decision to notify withdrawal or the notification itself would clearly be a constitutionally inappropriate and unlawful interference in the due democratic process.

The Court considered that the applicants had no real prospect of success on the merits of the claim, and for these reasons the Court refused the applicants permission to proceed with the appeal.

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